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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
CPLR 3024(b): Paragraph inserted in complaint in anticipation of
statute of limitations defense held prejudicial.
Under the CPLR, a party to an action may "move to strike any
scandalous or prejudicial matter unnecessarily inserted in a plead-
ing."' 54 In connection with such a motion, the Supreme Court, Oneida
County, has held that allegations which were inserted into a com-
plaint in anticipation of the defense of the statute of limitations fell
within the description of proscribed matter and therefore ordered the
allegations stricken.55
The paragraph complained of in Toper v. Rotach56 alleged mis-
representations by defendant's insurer relative to an action for per-
sonal injuries to a minor and to a derivative action by the minor's
parent, and was inserted to estop the defendant from asserting that
the expiration of the statute of limitations barred the father's deriva-
tive action. In striking this paragraph, the court noted that the de-
fendant might wish to waive his statute of limitations objection in
the relatively small derivative action, rather than prejudice his posi-
tion in the personal injury action by permitting proof of his repre-
sentative's conduct to be offered at the trial.57
Since the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense,58 facts
in respect thereto contained in a complaint are unnecessary, as the
failure of the defendant to assert the defense effectively waives it.59
Yet, defects in a pleading are to be ignored unless a substantial right
of the party is prejudiced.60 Thus, matter which is merely extraneous
may not be stricken on that ground alone: proof of prejudice is an
absolute necessity. 61
In Toper, the question of how much proof of prejudice is re-
quired before a 3024 motion will be granted was dealt with, and the
answer that issued is: not very much. Thus, if the matter is clearly
unnecessary to the pleadings, it will be deleted if there is little more
than a hint of prejudice. 62
54 CPLR 3024(b).
55 Toper v. Rotach, 507 N.Y.S.2d 805 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1970).
56 Id.
57 Of course, if the defense is pleaded, the plaintiff is free to controvert it by a
motion under 3211(b). Upon such a motion, plaintiff could present his evidence of
estoppel. CPLR 5211(c). Moreover, a trial on any issues of fact would be available.
H. WACHTELL, NEW YORK PRACTICE UNDER TrHE CPLR 168 (3d ed. 1970).
58 CPLR 3018(b).
593 WK&M 3018.18.
60 CPLR 3026.
61 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3024, supp. commentary at 181 (1969).
62 See 3 IVK&M 3024.12.
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